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ADOPTION OF FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION




T WO recent cases decided by the United States Courts of
Appeals for the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have reached con-
trary conclusions with respect to the authority of the FPC to ban
prospectively indefinite escalation clauses in independent producers'
contracts by general rulemaking procedures conducted under section
4 of the Administrative Procedure Act. The rules provide for
rejection without evidentiary hearing of (1) any future contract
filed by an independent producer of natural gas if such contract
contains a so-called "indefinite price-changing" escalation clause
providing for rate increases over the comparatively long-term period
of gas sales and (2) any application filed by such a producer for
a certificate of public convenience or necessity supported by such
a contract. In both cases the FPC rejected an application for a
certificate of convenience and necessity on the grounds that the
underlying contract contained pricing provisions not permissible
under Order 232 as amended by Order 232A of the Commission and
that the rejection was required by Order 242 of the Commission. The
principal concern of this Article is with the permissible use of rule-
making in lieu of adjudication within the purlieus drawn by the
courts in the two proceedings.1
I. BACKGROUND
The FPC maintained, until the Supreme Court ruled otherwise
*Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. B.A., LL.B., University of Wash-
ington; LL.M., Harvard University; S.J.D., Georgetown University. Legal consultant to
minority staff, House Banking and Currency Committee, 1961; General Counsel, Federal
Communications Commission, 1958-61; U.S. Delegate and Legal Adviser to the Chairman
of the United States Delegation, Administrative Radio Conference, International Tele-
communication Union, Geneva, Switzerland, 1959; Chief, Review Staff, Federal Com-
munications Commission, 1954-58; Chief Land Attorney, Housing and Home Finance
Agency, 1950-54; Member of the Washington and California Bars.
' This Article basically is a study and analysis of selected basic problems raised by the
two circuit cases. The focal issue is the scope and method of exercise of the rulemaking
power under the Natural Gas Act in the setting of the price-changing rules discussed. The
compass of the analysis has made detailed consideration of the Administrative Procedure
Act, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1958), unnecessary.
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in the Phillips' case, that it had no jurisdiction over an independent
producer of natural gas. However, after Phillips the courts further
determined that the conditioning power under section 7 (e) of the
Natural Gas Act' was no different for independent producers than
it was for pipeline companies' and that independent producers could
not file for rate increases under section 4 of the act in contravention
of provisions of contracts voluntarily entered into with purchasers.'
The consequence of the courts' decisions that an independent
producer was subject to the Natural Gas Act and that the powers
of the FPC were the same as applied to the independent producer'
or the pipeline company has been (1) to require the producer to
obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity under sec-
tion 7 of the act' subject to the conditioning power of the Com-
mission' prior to consummating any sale of gas in interstate com-
merce and (2) to subject any changes in the initial rate schedule
approved by the certificate of public convenience and necessity to
'Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
352 Stat. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717 (a)-(w) (1958).
'Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. FPC, 238 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1956).
'United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956). An im-
portant distinction was made in this case, re-emphasized later in United Gas Pipe Line Co.
v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 358 U.S. 103 (1958), that the FPC statute, unlike
the ICC statute, left the initiation of rates to the persons regulated, subject to filing with
and review by the FPC.
'The FPC's most recent definition (1962) of an independent producer is: "An 'inde-
pendent producer' as that term is used in this part means any person as defined in The
Natural Gas Act who is engaged in the production or gathering of natural gas and who
sells natural gas in interstate commerce for resale, but who is not engaged in the transporta-
tion of natural gas (other than gathering) by pipeline in interstate commerce." Order
243, 27 F.P.C. 341, 342 (1962).
'61 Stat. 459 (1947), 15 U.S.C. § 717f (1958). Section 7 provides, inter alia, for the
construction, extension, or abandonment of facilities and for certificates of convenience and
necessity.
Section 7(c) provides:
[N]o natural-gas company . . . shall engage in the transportation or sale of
natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission . . . unless there
ij in force .. .a certificate of public convenience and necessity ....
[T]he Commission shall set the matter for hearing .. .and the application
shall be decided in accordance with the procedure provided in subsection
(e). . . . 52 Stat. 825 (1938), as amended, 56 Stat. 83 (1943), 15 U.S.C.
§ 717f(c) (1959).
Section 7(e) provides:
[A] certificate shall be issued to any qualified applicant . . . if it is found
that the applicant is able and willing properly to . . . perform . . . and to
conform to . . . this chapter and the requirements, rules, and regulations of
the Commission . . . and that the proposed . . . sale . . . is or will be
required by the present or future public convenience and necessity . . ..
The Commission shall have the power to attach . . . such reasonable terms and
conditions as the public convenience and necessity may require. 56 Stat. 84
(1942), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e) (1958).
'Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959) (frequently referred
to as "CATCO").
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the provisions of sections 4' and 5" of the act, e.g., to the Commis-
sion's power to determine whether they are just and reasonable. The
Commission's powers of conditioning or of denying in these respects
are exercisable after a hearing as provided in sections 4, 5, and 7 of
the act.
Producers of gas for sale in interstate commerce sell such gas under
long-term contracts varying in duration from twenty to fifty years."
Furthermore, the Commission has declared such long-term contracts
desirable and appropriate in the public interest. 2 It is and has been
customary for such contracts to include clauses for price increases
over the period of years covered; such increases are specified in the
contract or are determinable from contract provisions on the basis
of future market prices, costs, and other contingencies. Each new
application for interstate sale is subject to the filing and review
requirements of section 7 of the act, which confers rulemaking
authority on the Commission and which contains hearing provisions"
with respect to the determination of the public convenience and
necessity. Additionally, price increases pursuant to the contract
clauses must be filed with the Commission before becoming effective
952 Stat. 822 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717(c) (1962). Section 4 provides for rates
and charges, schedules, and the suspension of revised rates.
Section 4(a) provides:
[A]l1 rates and charges . . . and all rules and regulations affecting or per-
taining to such rates or charges shall be just and reasonable and any such
rate or charge that is not just and reasonable is declared to be unlawful.
52 Stat. 822 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717c(a) (1958).
Section 4(b) provides, inter alia, that no company shall (1) make or grant any undue
preference or (2) maintain any unreasonable difference in rates, etc., as between localities
or classes of service. 52 Stat. 822 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717c(b) (1958).
Section 4(c) provides for the filing, under such regulations as the Commission pre-
scribes, of all rates and charges together with all contracts in any manner affecting or
relating thereto. 52 Stat. 822 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717c(c) (1958).
Section 4(d) provides:
[U]nless the Commission otherwise orders, no change shall be made by any
natural-gas company in any such rate, charge, classification, or service, or in
any rule, regulation, or contract relating thereto, except after thirty days'
notice to the Commission and the public. 52 Star. 822 (1938), 15 U.S.C.
§ 717c(d) (1958).
Section 4(e) provides for hearing upon the filing of the rate, charge, classification, or
service; for suspension up to five months; for the posting of bond to refund any amounts
collected and not finally approved by the Commission; and for the imposition of the
burden of proving such rate or charge is just and reasonable upon the applicant seeking
an increased rate or charge. 76 Stat. 72 (1962), 15 U.SC. S 717c(e) (1962).
'°52 Stat. 823 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717(d) (1958). Section 5 provides for fixing
rates and charges on the Commission's own motion. Section (a):
Whenever the Commission, after a hearing . . . shall find that any rate, charge,
or classification . . . is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or prefer-
ential . . . . 52 Stat. 823 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717(d) (1958).
"Order 232, 25 F.P.C. 379, 381 (1961) (separate statement of Commissioner Kline,
concurring in part, dissenting in part, in Order 232).
2 Id. at 380, 609.
a See note 7 supra.
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and, in this connection, must meet the statutory tests upon Commis-
sion review under section 44 of the act. Section 4 also empowers the
Commission to issue rules. Rates are thereafter reviewable in a hear-
ing under section 5 pursuant to the Commission's regulatory au-
thority over existing rates. 5 The standards under section 4 for
increases in rates are that they be just and reasonable and that they
grant no continuing undue preference. Similarly, the standards under
section 5, which provides for continuing supervision by the Com-
mission over existing rates, are that they be just and reasonable and
that they not be preferential.
The Commission has statutory authority under section 16," inter
alia, to prescribe such rules and regulations as it finds necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions of the act. The Commission
has authority under section 14,' inter alia, to undertake investigations
to aid in prescribing rules or regulations and, in this connection, to
take evidence and to compel testimony and the production of records.
On April 4, 1956, the FPC issued notice " of rulemaking in which
it proposed for consideration and submission of views a regulation to
prohibit the filing of contracts entered into by producers for sale
of gas in interstate commerce that contained either automatically-
activated pricing clauses tied to buyers' increased rates and pricing
indices on resale by the purchaser or "favored nation" clauses.
Written comments were requested and received from affected per-
sons. The so-called "favored nation" clauses, according to the FPC,"'
provided for an increase in the price paid by the purchasing inter-
state transporter to the applicant producer if the latter or any other
producer in the same field or other area of production received a
higher price from the same or another transporter or if a bona fide
offer to purchase gas was made to the applicant producer or any other
producer within such areas.
No action was taken in the rulemaking proceeding until 1961.
During this period covering almost five years, the Commission an-
nually recommended amendments to the Natural Gas Act to au-
thorize or clarify its authority with regard to the elimination of
clauses in independent producers' contracts of sale to interstate gas
transmission companies providing for changes of price to the pur-
14 See note 9 supra.
15 See note 10 supra.
16 52 Stat. 831 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717o (1958).
1752 Stat. 828 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717m (1958).
1
8 Notice 5-153, 21 Fed. Reg. 2388 (1956).
19 Ibid.
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chaser." However, the act has not been amended in accordance with
these recommendations.
II. THE RULES
On March 3, 1961, the Commission issued Order 23221 as the
result of the rulemaking proceeding. This order amended section
154.91(a) of the General Rules and Regulations (18 C.F.R. §
154.91 (a)) by adding definitions of "definite escalation clauses" and
"indefinite escalation clauses, 22 and section 154.93 (18 C.F.R.
154.93) by providing that "indefinite escalation clauses," as defined,
tendered for filing on or after April 1, 1961, would be inoperative
and of no effect at law.
Order 232 by its definition of "indefinite escalation clause," read
together with the definition of "definite escalation clause," proscribed
any contractual provisions for price increases except those (1) set
forth in definite amount and time in the contract or (2) providing
for reimbursement to the seller for changes in production, severance,
or gathering taxes levied upon him. The order was retroactive in
its applicability to contracts executed prior to April 1, 1961, but
filed at some time thereafter. As pointed out by the commissioner
who dissented in part, the order precluded any contractual provision
for price redeterminations through negotiation or arbitration be-
tween seller and buyer after a reasonable period such as five years
from the date of a contract." Significantly, on the same day that
Order 232 was issued, the Commission announced its decision in an
adjudicatory proceeding in which it expressed the general conclusion
that indefinite escalation clauses were contrary to the public interest."
Order 232 was greeted by the filing of many objections. It was
amended less than a month later by Order 232A,2' again issued in
rulemaking after Commission allowance of a brief time for sub-
mission of views.2" This order (1) removed the retroactive feature
of Order 232 and (2) added a third exception to the proscribed price
increase provisions. This exception met in some degree the dissenting
commissioner's criticism reflected above by excepting the following
contractual provision:
201960 FPC Ann. Rep. 15-17; 1959 FPC Ann. Rep. 12-13, 18-19; 1959 FPC Ann.
Rep. 15-16; 1957 FPC Ann. Rep. 17-18, 25-26; 1956 FPC Ann. Rep. § 367, at 17-19.
21 Order No. 232, 25 F.P.C. 379 (1961).
2 1id. at 380.
23Id. at 381 (separate statement of Commissioner Kline, concurring in part, dissenting
in part in Order 232).
"Pure Oil Company, 25 F.P.C. 383 (1961).
2
5Order 232A, 25 F.P.C. 609 (1961).
20 Ibid.
[Vol. 18
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3) [P]rovisions that, once in five-year contract periods during which
there is no provision for a change in price to a specific amount [para-
graph (2)], change a price at a definite date by a price-redetermination
based upon and not higher than a producer rate or producer rates which
are subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, are not in issue in
suspension or certificate proceedings, and are in the area of the price in
question."7
Many independent producers filed applications for rehearing with
respect to Order 232A, but were dismissed by the Commission on the
basis that the applications were not authorized by section 19 of the
act. The dismissals were affirmed by the courts." On October 10,
1961, the Commission issued notice29 of further amendment to section
154.93 (18 C.F.R. § 154.93) and other regulations as amended by
Order 232A. Thereafter, the Commission issued Order 242."° By
this order the Commission added nothing of substance to the fore-
going prohibitions, but (1) provided for administrative rejection of
contracts or of applications for certificates of public interest, con-
venience, and necessity which failed to comply with the order and
(2) thus, gave effect to a technical distinction between "freedom to
contract" and "freedom to file with the Commission." 1 In the notices
and orders there appears the finding that long-term gas sale con-
tracts with pipeline companies are "desirable" and "in the public
interest" or "in the interest of the consumer,""2 accompanied by the
finding that "indefinite" escalation provisions (all those not exempted
by the new rules) are not in the public interest. Applications for re-
hearing were filed and denied.3 Three gas producers whose conten-
tions were considered on the merits in the litigation analyzed in
this Article filed contracts or applications for certificates with the
Commission that were subject to the prohibitions of the orders that
27 Order 232A revised the Commission's Rules, 18 C.F.R. § 154.93, as follows:
Provided, That in contracts executed on or after April 3, 1961, for the sale
or transportation of natural gas subject to the jurisdiction of the Commis-
sion, any provision for a change of price other than the following provisions
shall be inoperative and of no effect at law; the permissible provisions for
a change in price are:
(1) provisions that change a price in order to reimburse the seller for all
or any part of the changes in production, severance, or gathering taxes levied
upon the seller;
(2) provisions that change a price to a specific amount at a definite date;
and [third provision which is set forth in the text above]. Id. at 610.
2'Sun Oil Co. v. FPC, 304 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 861
(1962); Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 317 F.2d 796 (10 Cir. 1963), rev'd, 32 U.S.L. Week 4370
(U.S. 1964).
"
9 Notice -, 26 Fed. Reg. 9732 (1961).
3o 27 F.P.C. 339 (1962).
a
1 d. at 340.
asSee, e.g., Order 232, 25 F.P.C. 379, 380 (1961); Order 232A, 25 F.P.C. 609 (1961).
"S3 ee, e.g., 27 F.P.C. 666 (1962).
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have been described. These filings were rejected, and petitions for
review were filed in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits."
III. THE ADMINISTRATIVE REASONS SUPPORTING THE RULES
The FPC made the following statements in promulgating Order
232:
General public notice of this proposed rule-making was given by publi-
cation in the Federal Register . . . and mailing notices to interested
parties ...
In response to such notice, numerous suggestions and comments were
submitted by interested parties . . . All such suggestions and com-
ments have been carefully considered, but, for reasons set forth in our
findings, we adhere to the rule as originally proposed with certain
changes made thereto.
The Commission finds:
(1) The natural gas industry and natural gas service are aided and
developed by the use of long-term contracts for the sale of natural
gas by producers . . . and it is desirable and appropriate in the public
interest that long-term contracts be utilized as a basis for considerations
of supply and service expansion ...
(2) Long-term gas supply contracts containing provisions for rate
changes dependent or based in part on 'indefinite escalation clauses' as
herein defined, have contributed to instability and uncertainty concern-
ing prices of gas and service expansion by natural gas companies. As
found by us in the proceeding of The Pure Oil Company... these in-
definite escalation provisions are contrary to the public interest. Such
escalation provisions, therefore, are undesirable, unnecessary, and incom-
patible with the public interest for the due and proper development of
natural gas service by natural gas companies.
(3) It is necessary and appropriate in the public interest and in the
proper administration of the Natural Gas Act that § 154.91 (a) . . .
be amended . . . to define clearly the amendment necessitated by our
findings in subparagraph (2) hereof."
In issuing Order 232A which amends Order 232, the FPC said:
Since March 3, interested persons have submitted views and comments
concerning the amendments to our regulations. Upon consideration of
" "Indefinite" price changing clauses have been upheld as valid exercises of the
contract making power in the following respects: spiral escalation clauses (Wisconsin v.
FPC, 373 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1963)); "favored nations clauses" (Texas Gas Transmission
Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 363 U.S. 263 (1960)); agreement binding the customer to the
"going rate" as fixed by ex parte filings (United Gas Pipeline Co. v. Memphis Light,
Gas & Water Div., 3 58 U.S. 103 (1958)); price related to the weighted average of royalty
payments in a defined area (Phillips v. FPC, 258 F.2d 906 (10th Cir. 1958)); price
fixed by the ratio to increased rates received by the pipeline company (Kerr-McGee v.
FPC, 260 F.2d 102 (10th Cir. 1958)); and the "prevailing field price" plus gathering
charges (Cities Serv. Gas Producing Co. v. FPC, 233 F.2d 726 (10th Cir. 1956)).
35 2s F.P.C. 379, 380 (1961). The issue of the proposed rulemaking was "also fully
tried, briefed, and argued before the Commission in The Pure Oil Co. . . . in which decision
is being issued this day .. " Id. at 380 n.1.
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such comments and upon our own further consideration, we find it
necessary and appropriate to modify the amendments promulgated by
Order No. 232.
We reaffirm our earlier findings that . . . indefinite escalation pro-
visions are, in general, contrary to the public interest. However, it also
appears that elimination of all indefinite escalation provisions would
be too restrictive .... Therefore ... we should permit future contracts
to contain limited price-redetermination provisions.
In promulgating Order 242, the FPC stated:
Public notice of proposed rule making was given by publication . . .
and by mailing copies. . . . In response to such notice, numerous com-
ments were submitted. These comments have been carefully considered
but, for the reasons set forth below, we adhere to the substance of the
amendments as originally proposed.
A number of parties contend that the promulgation of these regula-
tions would be unlawful and beyond the powers granted by the Com-
mission. . . . We conclude . . . that sections 4, 5, and 7 of the Natural
Gas Act contemplate that the Commission will refuse to approve con-
tractual provisions found adverse to the public interest. Section 16 of
the Act . . . authorizes the Commission to issue rules and regulations
of general applicability found necessary or appropriate to carry out the
provisions of the Act.
Protection of the public interest is the touchstone of our regulatory
powers under the Natural Gas Act. . . . To be sure, the proposed rule
will have impact upon contractual practices which have been fairly
widespread. But the real issue is not one of 'freedom of contract'; the
question is whether the rule is rationally related to a condition which
requires correction if regulatory objectives embraced by the statute
are to be achieved....
We held in the Pure Oil case that indefinite escalation clauses are
contrary to the public interest and restated this conclusion in Order
No. 232A. . . . These filings bear no apparent relationship to the
economic requirements of the producers who file them....
Filings under indefinite escalation clauses have created a significant
portion of the administrative burdens under which this Commission is
laboring today. . . . Accordingly, in protecting the public against
waves of increases which have no defensible basis, we also serve the
need . . . of making the tasks of regulations more manageable. 7
It should be noted that the FPC made particular reference in its
justification of the orders to its adjudicatory decision entered after
hearing before an examiner"8 in the Pure Oil case."8 This decision was
issued the same day that the Commission issued Order 232. It is
significant that this proceeding is the only adjudication by the FPC
which involved the general policy question. The decision resulted
325 F.P.C. 609 (1961).
3727 F.P.C. 339 (1962).
"
8The Examiner's decision appears at 25 F.P.C. 392 (1959).
" The Commission's decision in The Pure Oil Company appears at 25 F.P.C. 383 (1961).
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from a hearing held upon an application for rate increases founded
on escalation clauses contained in Pure Oil Company's contracts with
a pipeline purchaser. The Commission denied the application for
proposed increased rates, ordered certain refunds, and condemned the
specific escalation clauses involved in the proceeding as well as in-
definite escalation clauses generally as contrary to the public interest.
The Commission, however, refused to declare the particular escala-
tion clauses before it in Pure Oil void or voidable" because of its
expressed conviction that the clauses were so material to the con-
tracts containing them that the contracts would fall with the clauses
and the Pure Oil Company then would be enabled to file for rate
increases whenever it felt justified in doing so."
No independent producer other than Pure Oil was a party to
the proceeding although several consumer or distributor participants
were admitted as intervenors. The escalation clauses were not utterly
indefinite; they were subject to contractual standards in their applica-
4 The Commission previously had severed this issue insofar as decision thereon by
the Examiner was concerned and had reserved its determination to the Commission. Id.
at 385.
41 Id. at 388-89. The Commission cited United Gas Pipeline Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv.
Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956), and United Gas Pipeline Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water
Div., 358 U.S. 103 (1958). In Mobile after entering into a ten year contract with United,
a pipeline company and a natural gas company, to obtain gas at the price of 10.70 per mcf,
a distributor of natural gas to consumers in Mobile, Alabama, entered into a ten year
contract to supply Ideal Cement Company, an industrial consumer, with gas at a price
of 120 per mcf. United subsequently filed, unilaterally, a new rate schedule under § 4
of the Natural Gas Act raising the rate to 14.50 per mcf. Mobile objected, but the
Commission sustained the filing. The Third Circuit held United could not file the increased
rate and held Mobile entitled to a return of the amounts paid in excess of the contract
rate. The Supreme Court said, in part:
[W]e hold that the Natural Gas Act does not give natural gas companies the
right to change their rate contracts by their own unilateral action.
In construing the Act, we should bear in mind that it evinces no purpose
to abrogate private rate contracts as such. To the contrary, by requiring
contracts to be filed with the Commission, the Act expressly recognizes that
rates to particular customers may be set by individual contracts.
The obvious implication is that, except as specifically limited by the Act,
the rate-making powers of natural gas companies were to be no different from
those they would possess in the absence of the Act: to establish ex pare, and
change at will, the rates offered to prospective customers; or to fix by con-
tract, and change only by mutual agreement, the rate agreed upon with a
particular customer. 350 U.S. 332, 337-43 (1956). (Emphasis added.)
In the Memphis case United sought to file rate schedules increasing its pipeline rates
under contracts providing in part that "All gas delivered hereunder shall be paid for by
Buyer under Seller's Rate Schedule . . . or any effective superseding rate schedules, on
file with the Federal Power Commission." Thus, this case differs from the Mobile case in
which the rate was a definite amount for the contract period. The FPC accepted the
filing, but the court, under the Mobile decision, directed the FPC to reject the rates. The
Supreme Court reversed and said:
United bound itself to furnish gas to these customers during the life of
the agreements not at a single fixed rate, as in Mobile, but at what in effect
amounted to its current 'going' rate. Contractually this left United free to
change its rates from time to time, subject, of course, to the procedures
and limitations of the Natural Gas Act. 358 U.S. 103, 110 (1958).
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tion.4' The holding of the examiner's initial decision in the case was
that the rate increases provided for did not conform to the con-
tractual standards, and it was upon this ground, as supported by
substantial evidence, that the Seventh Circuit affirmed the FPC de-
cision in the proceeding.43 The FPC, however, had chosen the pro-
ceeding" as a vehicle for policy utterances (which the court found
unnecessary to consider) appropriate to various forms of escalation
clauses:
Considering all the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the two-
party favored nation clauses in Pure's contracts with El Paso, and
indefinite escalation clauses generally,' are contrary to the public inter-
est. From the beginning of Commission regulation of independent pro-
ducers under the Phillips decision in 1954,4 the undesirable and in-
jurious aspects of such escalation provisions generally have been forcibly
impressed on us and proceedings were early instituted looking to the
elimination of such provisions." And although the record in this case
was made with special reference to Pure's two-party provisions, by
reasonable implication it confirms our conclusion based upon our ex-
perience with other types of indefinite escalation provisions, that such
provisions generally are contrary to the public interest.4'
The Commission's footnote 3, describing forms of escalation clauses
in use, is set out in the note below.4 Footnote 4 is the citation to
4 2 FPC Examiner Law, in his initial decision (25 F.P.C. 392 (1959)), described the
applicable factors as follows:
The contracts filed as Pure's Rate Schedules Nos. 1 and 28 each provide that
in determining whether the price payable under such other contract or agree-
ment is 'higher' than the price 'payable for gas under this agreement,' due
consideration shall be given to the provisions of the said agreement as com-
pared with such other contract or agreement as to quality and quantity
of gas, delivery pressures, gathering and compressing arrangements, pro-
visions regarding measurement of gas including deviation from Boyle's
Law, taxes payable on or with respect to such gas, and all other perti-
nent factors. The contract filed as Pure's Gas Rate Schedule No. 3 differs
from the contracts filed as Rate Schedules Nos. I and 28 in that in de-
termining whether the price payable for gas under another contract is higher
than the price paid under the agreement, 'quantity' is not included within
the due consideration clause, the term 'compressing' obligations is used
instead of 'compressing arrangements' and the words 'except quantity' appear
at the end of the clause after the word 'factors.' Id. at 393.
'Pure Oil Co. v. FPC, 299 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1962).
425 F.P.C. 383, 387-92 (1961).4 1Id. at 388.
46 In contrast to two-party favored nation clauses such as Pure's, which are
activated by higher prices paid to any other supplier by the same purchaser,
under three-party favored nation clauses prices are activated by higher prices
paid to any other supplier by any purchaser. In addition to the above-
described types of escalation clauses, several other types of escalation clauses,
applicable in specified areas, are frequently encountered in producer gas sales
contracts. Periodic escalation clauses generally provide that the price currently
paid under the contract shall be increased by specific amounts at certain
definite times in the future. Redetermination clauses generally provide that
the price currently paid under the contract shall be subject to upward adjust-
ment at certain specified times to reflect the average of the highest prices
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the Phillips decision; footnote 5 is a reference to the 1956 notice of
rulemaking. No other supporting citations appear.
The Commission supports its general policy against indefinite
escalation clauses by a series of arguments attributed to the hearing
record. Thus, the clauses are "inherently unreasonable" because:
[P]rices are subject to triggering if ... [the purchaser] pays any other
producer within the specified area a higher price. As indicated pre-
viously, under Pure's provisions, the company's prices are subject to
triggering if El Paso pays any other producer within the specified area
a higher price. There need be no economic or other substantial justifi-
cation for the increase; the mere fact that a higher price is paid to
some other producer would be sufficient to activate the increase. In
our view, such an artificial ground for a proposed increase, operating
in such a mechanical and arbitrary manner, and lacking any substantial
relationship to the factors which bear on the value of gas or on a
determination of a reasonable level of rates for it does not constitute a
proper basis for filing proposed increased rates or a sufficient justification
for our giving effect to such a filing, at least if the rate contained
therein is in excess of those in our producer price Policy Statement 61-1,
as amended. And although other types of indefinite escalation provisions
are triggered by other kinds of mechanisms, they are in principle sub-
ject to these same objections.""
Since the escalator clauses of Pure Oil (under the terms of the
contract) were not activated automatically by higher prices paid by its
purchasers to sellers other than Pure, as found by the examiner and
the Commission under the issue directly involved in the Pure Oil
hearing, i.e., the justification urged for the increase was found not
to fall within the permissive standards of the escalation clauses them-
selves, the price-triggering conclusion of the Commission lacks
warrant in the record.
The Commission states further that if Pure's escalation clauses
result in price increases, a chain reaction takes place in regard to
other producers' contracts containing escalation clauses, one such
filing following another. Here, the Commission specifies evidence
adduced by the purchaser in the proceeding that such a reaction is
probable because of spiral escalation clauses in the purchaser's con-
tracts with Phillips Petroleum Company. Having credited this evi-
then paid by buyers to other supplies [sic] for gas delivered under sub-
stantially similar terms and conditions. Spiral escalation clauses generally pro-
vide that in the event the price which the buyer receives for the gas is
increased, the price concurrently paid by the buyer to the supplier under the
contract shall be increased in proportion to the buyer's increase. Other similar
types of clauses, the nature of which is largely self-explanatory, include bona
fide offer type of favored nation clauses, commodity index adjustment clauses,
renegotiation clauses, and tax adjustment clauses. Ibid.
471d. at 389.
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dence, the Commission by footnote"' states, however, that the spiral
escalation clauses have been eliminated by amendment from Phillips'
contracts.
There can be no doubt of the general existence of some chain
reaction possibility. Nonetheless, in adopting this line of reasoning,
the Commission disregards the presence of contractual standards con-
trolling and defining the escalation provisions in the very proceeding
before it.
When, however, the Commission contemplates its workload-as
the application of contractual standards to specific market conditions
takes its foreseeable toll of supervisory staff time-the Commission
gives direct consideration to the contractual standards.
In addition, it is true, as staff contends, that the tremendous number
of escalation increases we are required to pass on has given rise to a
very heavy administrative burden on the Commission and on our staff.
The difficulties in dealing with such proposed increases result not merely
from the large number of such increases; they flow also from the com-
plexity of many of the controverted contractual provisions we are
required to interpret and apply. According to staff, a comparison of
all the factors listed in the contracts involved herein would necessitate
many dozen different comparisons. At the least, as this case demon-
strates, the interpretation and application of such clauses involve con-
troverted factual problems and difficult legal questions. Of course, the
importance of considering administrative difficulties lies in the fact that
the time and effort spent in dealing with escalation increases is dis-
proportionate, and furthermore becomes unavailable for matters of
perhaps greater public importance. "
The Seventh Circuit"0 sustained the Commission in Pure Oil be-
cause there was substantial evidence in the record that the rate
increases did not comply with the contractual conditions precedent
to the exercise by Pure of the escalation rights." Obviously, the
FPC staff, and a reviewing court in more limited ways later, must
measure the relevance of the factors urged by Pure for the exercise
of the escalation right by taking into consideration, inter alia, the
contractual standards in relation to the rate of increase proposed. At
least this much administrative burden was entailed, putting to one
side the ultimate appraisal of the reasonableness of the proposed rate
of increase that the statute ineluctably compels the Commission to
consider. This administrative burden, however, has not been made a
statutory element of rate review, and, hence, its quantum, however
4 1Id. at 389 n.7.49 ld. at 390.
'
0 Pure Oil Co. v. FPC, 299 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1962).
"'That the judicial affirmance in Pure Oil is thus limited is recognized by the 1962
FPC Ann. Rep. 119.
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appealingly and forcefully phrased, would not constitute substantial
evidence supporting a finding that escalation clauses generally con-
travene the public interest, if indeed such administrative burden
qualifies as evidence.
Finally, the Commission decision in Pure Oil turns to the basic
evidence and argument of the applicant in defense of its escalation
provisions. The evidence and argument is stated by the Commission
as follows:
Pure, in taking the position that its escalation provisions are not
contrary to the public interest, relies heavily on evidence adduced by
its witnesses Foster and Dorau. Basically, these witnesses sought to
justify these provisions as proper means of pricing producer sales by
testimony that such so-called 'flexible forward pricing' provisions are
the product of competing forces of supply and demand operating in
a free market, and that by giving effect to free market influences in
fixing prices for sales, they direct gas resources to their most efficient
and socially desirable uses. According to Pure, such provisions thereby
assure the long-term gas supply contracts and financial commitments
which underlie pipeline development and service to the public. Without
long-term supply contracts, future supplies of gas cannot be assured,
Pure argues, and the risks of pipeline projects and difficulties of financ-
ing are greatly increased. Also, producers for their own protection must
be able to employ favored nations clauses if they are going to enter
into such long-term contracts, said Pure. The company contends that
in the face of rising trends in prices and costs generally and the decline
in the value of money, an unchanged gas price would result in sub-
stantial liquidation of the investment values of producers, with conse-
quent adverse effects on the ability of producers to command invest-
ment and to maintain supplies of gas.'
The Commission disposes of the producer's contention-basic to
the FPC's condemnation of escalator clauses generally-initially in
tones of dismissal under preceding arguments." It then discounts
the "free market" argument on two grounds, (1) the lack of con-
sideration in escalator clauses to the market generally as distinguished
from a particular sale under similar conditions and (2) the presence
of state governmental proration and conservation controls."' The
Commission concludes that the escalation provision has "outlived
whatever economic function" it may have had in the past under
present conditions of high level gas prices and numerous avail-
able purchasers." The responsiveness of this conclusion to the Pure
Oil contention will be discussed in the light of the three exceptions
.225 F.P.C. at 390.
5 Ibid.
4Id. at 390-91.
5I1d. at 3 91.
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in Order 232A that constitute the Commission's determination of
when an apparent relationship exists between an "indefinite" escalation
clause in a long-term gas sale contract and "the economic require-
ments of the producers who sell the gas."
Pure also stressed the importance of an incentive to explore
for gas and to maintain supplies in interstate flow; it contended
that elimination of the clauses would require provisions in con-
tracts for higher fixed prices and more frequent applications for
price increases."6 The Commission answered 7 in such terms as, "If
additional incentives are found necessary, measures can be taken to
supply them. . . ."; as to higher price predictions similar answers are
expressed in dismissing them as "most unlikely" and projecting in-
stead "proposals . .. solidly grounded on a basis having a rational
connection to the factors of significance in determining proper price
for gas. . . ." Only in this last projection does the Commission appear
to confront the basic argument of Pure that entering into long-
term contracts encouraged by the Commission policy is causally
pertinent to the Commission-reserved general escalation issue. It is
fair to say that generalizations such as "proposals ... solidly grounded
on a basis having a rational connection to the factors of signifi-
cance . . ." leave something to be desired if judged by the test of
reasoned conclusions."8 It is also dubious whether the producer's refer-
ence to conditions of present supply and demand contribute much
more in the way of a reasoned disposition of the long-term con-
tractual contention.
The three exceptions provided by the Commission to the escalation
proscription; viz., (1) specifically provided price increases at definite
future dates stipulated in the contracts, (2) provision for reimburse-
ment of seller for changes in certain taxes, and (3) price increases
at five-year intervals under price-redetermination between the parties
(such price not to be higher than a rate in the area involved that is not
in issue in certificate or suspension proceedings); would seem to be
the conception by the Commission in its statement in the Pure Oil
decision of "proposals . . . solidly grounded on a basis having a
rational connection to the factors of significance in determining the
proper price for gas."
56 ibid.
51 Ibid.
"s25 F.P.C. 392 (1959). This comment relates only to the "general" issue, the Com-
mission's findings which were relied upon in the sequence of Orders 232, 232A, and 242.
Such findings were in the nature of obiter dictum in the Pure Oil decision for, as observed
supra, the Commission's findings under the specific issue, e.g., the lack of relationship of
the increased rate proposed by Pure Oil to the contractual escalation standards, were sup.
ported by substantial evidence.
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The first standard, that of specific price increases at definite future
dates provided in the producers' contracts (if otherwise feasible)
scarcely seems consistent with the Commission reiteration in each
of its orders that price flexibility is necessary for the effectuation of
its long-term contract policy. The second standard, viz., price in-
crease accommodation to changes in tax levies, is consistent with
such a policy but only partial in its reach. The third standard possesses
the characteristics of a contractually-imposed price freeze because
the Supreme Court in the Mobile decision laid down the rule that a
producer could not apply for a price increase exceeding a price to
which he had committed himself by contract." In filing for a price
increase during a five-year period representing a redetermination
under such a contractual provision, one producer would seem limited
by the past successes of another springing perhaps from factually
unrelated conditions. It is questionable whether such an imposed
standard upon long-term contractual provisions is on more solid
ground in its "rational connection to the factors of significance" in
determining the proper price for gas.6"
The general policy decision against indefinite escalation clauses-
that the Commission reserved for its own decision-thus was dealt
with by a finding largely conclusionary and removed from the context
of the proceeding. The Commission's repeated reference to immediate
triggering of the Pure escalation clauses by each higher sale of gas
ignored the conditions precedent in the contracts.6 Pure's misapplica-
tion of the contractual provisions was relevant only to the permissi-
bility of the particular increases, not to a producer's need of or the
public harm occasioned by such provisions themselves. The Commis-
sion's marked obfuscation of this issue may be traceable to a war-
ranted impatience with all that adds to a heavy workload, including
interpretations of escalation provisions." Seemingly, the root of such
" United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956).60See United Gas Improvement Co. v. FPC, 283 F.2d 817, 823-24 (9th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied sub. nom., Superior Oil Co. v. United Gas Improvement Co., 365 U.S. 879
(1961).6 t The Pure Oil Co., 25 F.P.C. 383 (1961).
69 A total of 6,597 rate filings seeking field price changes were made by inde-
pendent producers during fiscal 1962, compared with 7,915 filings the
previous year ...
During the year the Commission acted on 1,550 increases based on contract
escalation provisions and renegotiation of prior existing contracts, and on 4
increases involving State taxes. Of this total, 746 increases aggregating about
$6,428,493 yearly were allowed without suspension, and 808 increases, totaling
$7,501,816 were suspended. The Commission also disposed of 188 increases,
amounting to $10,515,222 per year, representing filings which after suspension
were either allowed, disallowed, or withdrawn by the companies. This left
4,458 increases involved in 2,902 dockets, for $164,870,541 annually, pending
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impatience is to be found in the "administrative burden" factor, and
out of this factor substantive policy should not be fashioned that is
not otherwise authorized by the regulatory statute.'
To the objection of the producers, apparently at least in part
addresssed to the intrusion upon freedom of contract involved, as
may be gathered from the relatively brief reference thereto made
in Order 242, the Commission merely answered that this was not
the real issue; rather, said the Commission, the rule meets the test-
"whether the rule is rationally related to a condition which requires
correction if regulatory objectives embraced by the statute are to
be achieved.""
This, it would seem, partakes of an exercise in short shrift on so
basic a question. As a reason supporting an act of Commission dis-
cretion, it is no reason at all. Moreover, that some question of freedom
of contract is presented is self-evident, a fact neither blunted nor
dismissed merely by being turned aside. Last, it was assumed that
the application of the "rational relationship" rule was a limitation
judicially contructed for purposes of court review of agency rules
or policy. It comes as a surprise that this rule of the courts may be
substituted by the administrative agency for the very exercise of
reasoned expert judgment in deference to which the courts invoke
the rule. As was said by a dissenting judge in another context of
rulemaking review: "Our review of the merits of Commission de-
cisions is limited. One of the justifications for the limitation falls
away if the parties are not afforded a full opportunity to be heard
before the Commission itself. . .. ""
The rulemaking process followed here by the FPC may be com-
pared with the evolution of a FCC rule as described in a recent
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. In Van Curler Broadcasting Corp. v. United States,"" the
validity of a rule of the FCC was in question. After a rulemaking
proceeding under section 4 (b) of the Administrative Procedure Act,
the National Table of Assignments of Television Channels was
amended to add channel 10 to Vail Mills, New York. The Court said:
Since the Commission did not summarily depart from established
principles or program, but on the contrary followed a course clearly
as of June 30, 1962. Of the 188 increases disposed of after suspension, the
Commission allowed $7,232,084 of the proposed $10,515,222 in annual in-
creases. 1962 FPC Ann. Rep. 105.
63See note 93 infra.
"27 F.P.C. 339, 340 (1962).
"'Judge Fahy, dissenting, in Owensboro on the Air, Inc. v. United States, 262 F.2d
702, 709-10 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
"6236 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 935 (1956).
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anticipated and provided for in its basic Sixth Report, its action can in
no sense be deemed artitrary or capricious. . . .The conclusion reached
by the Commission is clearly stated. The basis and purpose of the order
are ample and understandably, even though succinctly, stated and are
within the considerations prescribed by the statute as criteria for
Commission action. The order is also consistent with the provisions
of the act dealing with the distribution of licenses. The given reasons
are rational and support the conclusion. Having reached the foregoing
conclusions the function of the court is at an end in a case such as
this . . . ." (Emphasis added; footnotes omitted.)
IV. THE LITIGATION
The Tenth Circuit decided the first appeal from a rejection by the
FPC of a contract filed with it by a natural gas company for the
sale of gas to a pipe line purchaser; the sales contract contained an
indefinite price changing clause. "s The court held (1) that the re-
'"Id. at 729-30.
"' The contractual provisions with respect to escalation of gas prices over the period
of the contract, rejected by the Commission in Texaco, Inc., follow:
Redetermination Clause. (2) At least six (6) months prior to the begin-
ning of the third five (5) year period of the delivery term and at least
six (6) months prior to the beginning of the fourth five (5) year period
of the delivery term [20 years], Buyer and Seller shall endeavor to agree upon
a renegotiated price to be paid during the succeeding five (5) year period in
lieu of the price as provided herein. The parties hereto shall, for each of the
periods respectively, upon facts existing six (6) months prior to each such
period, determine and fix as the renegotiated price for such ensuing period the
average of three (3) prices, each of which gives the highest price provided
to be paid by one of the three (3) different purchasers of gas for re-sale in
other states for ultimate public consumption paying the highest prices to
producers for gas being produced from a field or fields lying wholly or
partly within Texas and Beaver Counties, Oklahoma, under agreements arrived
at by arm's length bargaining, which agreements are in existence without
condition of authorization of any regulatory authority not then granted six
(6) months prior to the beginning of such period, between such producers
and such purchasers (non-affiliated with such producers); provided, however,
no such agreements shall be considered which provide for a yearly quantity
greater than the quantity purchased by Buyer from Seller hereunder during
the preceding year. The price so fixed shall be fixed in cents per thousand
(1,000) cubic feet for the five (5) year period based upon the determinable
prices in such agreements and provided further that such price shall not be
less than the price provided for such period herein by Paragraph (1) hereof.
In the event the contracts considered in determining the price hereunder
contained provisions varying from the corresponding provisions of this agree-
ment with respect to differences in tax allowances, methods of computation
of quantities, and any other differences in pressure base or payment for
gathering, compression, quality, dehydration or any other matter having a
bearing on price, then the variations in such provisions shall be taken into
account and appropriate adjustments in the stipulated prices set out in such
contracts shall be made to compensate for such variations to arrive at an
adjusted price which will cover deliveries and receipt of gas under condi-
tions comparable to those set out herein. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 5-6,
Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 317 F.2d 796 (10th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 32 U.S.L. Week
4370 (U.S. 1964).
The reference to price as provided in paragraph (1) of the contract is explained at
page 2 of the Brief for Respondent FPC in the proceeding: "The contract . . . provides
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jection constituted invalid agency action because it was not founded
upon any evidence that the court could review and (2) that the rule
providing for such rejection was invalid because the Commission,
pursuant to general statutory rulemaking authority, could not regu-
late in conflict with specific provisions of the Natural Gas Act
prescribing hearings for initial certification and rate review. The
court also decided that the rules did not contain the statutory findings
required by the substantive statutory provisions."
Basically, the Tenth Circuit in the Texaco decision found that
there was no authority under sections 4, 5, and 7 of the Natural
Gas Act to act upon the price increase clauses without a hearing and
that section 16 of the act, which empowers the Commission to make
rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of the act, was not
a source of power to regulate in conflict with the substantive pro-
visions of the act. Significantly, the Tenth Circuit relied on FCC v.
ABC, Inc.7" The court pointedly said: "[W]e have no way of de-
termining the factual basis for . . . [the Commission's] findings
because we have before us no record of facts to sustain them." 1
The Ninth Circuit, some months later, decided the second such
appeal from a Commission rejection action on essentially similar
facts. ' The court held that (1) the Commission has statutory power
for a price of 17 cents for Mcf for the first five-years; 18-1/2 cents for the second five-
year period; 20 cents for the third five-year period and 21-1/2 cents for the fourth five-
year period .. " Brief for Respondent, p. 2, Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, supra.
" Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, supra, note 68.
70 347 U.S. 284 (1954). In this case the Supreme Court rejected a rule of the Com-
mission that attempted to go beyond the Congressional grant of authority with respect
to lotteries.
7 Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 317 F.2d 796, 806 (10th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 32 U.S.L. Week
4370 (U.S. 1964).
72 The contractual provisions with respect to escalation of gas prices over the period
of the contract rejected by the Commission in the Superior Oil case follow:
Redetermination Clause. Seller shall have the right at its option, to request
a redetermination of the price provided in Section 7 of this Article to be
paid for any one or more or all (but not part) of the periods set out in (b),
(c), (d) and (e) above. Any such request made with respect to any of such
periods shall be made in writing during the six (6) months immediately
preceding the commencement of such period. If Seller shall make any such
request, representatives of Buyer and Seller shall promptly meet and attempt
to determine the then reasonable market price of the gas deliverable hereunder.
In making such determination, consideration shall be given to all pertinent
factors. The price so determined by Buyer and Seller shall be the price
applicable during the entire period with respect to which the same was
determined; provided that if such price shall be less than the price provided in
Section 7 of this Article with respect to such period, the price during such
period shall be as provided in Section 7. 322 F.2d 601, 603-04 n.5.
Favored-Nation Clause. Buyer agrees that the price to be paid from time
to time to Seller hereunder for Residue Gas shall never be less than the price
being paid by Buyer to others for comparable gas delivered under comparable
conditions within the area shown on Exhibit 'B' attached hereto. Id. at 604
n.6.
The Commission makes no objection to a third price escalation provision, save in the
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to issue general rules and regulations, (2) the rules in question,
tested by the factual premise under which the Commission sup-
ported it, were valid as rationally related to statutory objects of
Commission regulation, and (3) the rejection was permissible be-
cause the gas producer presented no special justification to the
Commission that would require a hearing (under the certifica-
tion and rate review provisions) on the issue of waiver or modi-
fication of the rules in his behalf.73 The court's opinion, which is
most carefully and tightly written, confined the result reached
to the issue raised by the proceedings before the court. The reasoning
of the court in reaching its result points, however, in the direction
of subordinating statutory requirements of an evidentiary hearing to
the general rulemaking authority of administrative agencies. This
question becomes no less serious or substantive by the presence of a
caveat that the persons affected may pray for relief under limited
waiver provisions of the agencies's rules of practice. Therefore, a
serious substantive and procedural question is raised.
The Ninth Circuit in the Superior Oil case reached a result opposite
to that of the Tenth Circuit by taking up the arguments advanced
by the producer in that case seriatim and essentially on the authority
of U.S. v. Storer Broadcasting Co.'4 disposing of all but the question
of the FPC's substantive authority. It first passed upon the question
of whether, assuming that the FPC had the substantive authority to
reject the price-changing provisions of the contract, it could do so
by rulemaking rather than through ad hoc proceedings requiring an
adjudicatory hearing. The court, relying on Storer, in effect con-
cluded that anything which can be done by adjudicatory hearing can
be done through rulemaking.
Next, the court took up the constitutional question of interference
with rate and certificate filings. It concluded that if statutory hearing
requirements could be met by substantive rulemaking procedures-
with flexibility because of possible amendment or waiver under
Agency Rules of Practice and Procedure7 -- the constitutional re-
particular that it conditioned its grant of certification upon a decrease by Superior of the
initial rate from 20 per Mcf to 17.70. The provision, prior to Superior's acceptance of
such condition, is described as follows:
The pricing terms . . . called for an initial price of 20 cents per Mcf for
the first five years commencing with the date of initial delivery under the
original contract. It provided for a price of 21 cents per Mcf for the second
five-year period, 22 cents per Mcf for the third five-year period, 23 cents per
Mcf for the fourth five-year period, and 24 cents for Mcf thereafter if the
contract remained in effect. . . . Id. at 603 n.4.
"Superior Oil Co. v. FPC, 322 F.2d 601, 617 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 32 U.S.L.
Week 3385 (U.S. 1964).
7'351 U.S. 192 (1956).
7s 12 Fed. Reg. 8473 (1947), as amended, 27 Fed. Reg. 9499, 11001 (1962).
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quirements of due process also could be met by such provisions. The
court said this implicitly was decided in the affirmative in the
Storer case.
Finally, the court dealt with the question of the substantive author-
ity to reject by rule contracts containing these price-changing provis-
ions. Here, the court could not rely on Storer. By rather strained rea-
soning," the court took the Supreme Court's holding in Atlantic Ref.
Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n," which held that in a section 7 cer-
tificate proceeding the FPC had power to scrutinize initial prices in
deciding public convenience and necessity, and assumed that the
FPC must also have power to scrutinize price-changing clauses
(applicable over the life of a gas sale contract) that might trigger
future rate filings. The reasoning is dubious for (1) the ground set
forth by the Supreme Court to support its finding does not seem
present as to price-changing clauses"8 and if it is, (2) the source
of the power of general rejection by rulemaking is not thereby
established. "
The Storer case was decided by the Supreme Court in 1956. ° It
involved an appeal from a rule of the FCC. The application of Storer
for a permit to construct and operate a sixth television station was
dismissed without hearing by the FCC on the basis of a "multiple
ownership" rule. That rule limited the number of television station
ownerships in any one person to five, for the stated purpose of pre-
venting a concentration of communications control contrary to the
public interest. Storer claimed that his right of hearing, provided by
the Communications Act prior to denial of a license application,
could not be abrogated by a rule, though he conceded the right of
Congress to withhold such right if Congress determined a grant of
an application would be contrary to the public interest (thus con-
ceding that the Commission action presented a question of statutory
rather than of constitutional due process).
7' Superior Oil Co. v. FPC, 322 F.2d 601, 617-18 (9th Cir. 1963).
7360 U.S. 378 (1959).
78 In Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n (CATCO), 360 U.S. 378 (1959),
the Supreme Court held that the FPC should be rigorous under S 7 of the act in condi-
tioning initial certificates as to initial prices set forth in gas sales contracts pursuant to
the statutory standard of public interest, convenience, and necessity because the Com-
mission's power to review such rates subsequently on its own motion under § 5 did not
include the power to require a refund as in the case of increases in existing rates under
§ 4.
7 It is elementary that administrative rules and regulations must find their source in
statutory authority. U.S. v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 521-22 (1911) (sustaining regula-
tions promulgated for the protection of national forests by the Secretary of Agriculture);
Pedersen v. Benson, 255 F.2d 524 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (finding invalid a licensure system
imposed by the Secretary of Agriculture in relation to an imported giraffe).
88United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
The Supreme Court said that Congress had provided with care for
fair opportunity by open competition in the use of broadcasting
facilities, a requirement directly related to rules respecting public
protection against ownership concentration, although express au-
thorization for the specific limitations contained in the rules did
not exist. The Court's opinion refers to the broad general rule-
making authority provided by sections 4(i) and 303(r) of the
Communications Act (quite similar in import to that of section 16
of the Natural Gas Act, as remarked by the Ninth Circuit opinion
in Superior)." Storer meets directly the contention of statutory clash
between the exercise of rulemaking authority and the statutory hear-
ing provision by (1) reference to and exposition of the substantive
statutory provision relative to competition, (2) emphasis upon pre-
vious Commission use of concentration of control as a policy factor,
as upheld in NBC v. United States"2 and FCC v. Allentown Broad-
casting Corp.,' and (3) reference to the need for considering the
context of the act. The Court said: "Courts are slow to interfere
with their [specialized agencies'] conclusions when reconcilable with
statutory directions . ,,84 The Court pointed out that under the
FCC's Rules of Practice and Procedure a waiver or exception to the
rules could be requested, but that sufficient justification for such
waiver or exception would be a prerequisite to a full hearing in view
of the extensive administrative hearings conducted by the Com-
mission before promulgating the rules.
The Storer decision, insofar as it sustained summary rejection of an
application, did not pronounce a new doctrine. Before Storer there had
been other cases upholding the power of an agency to dismiss applica-
tions or other matters without according a statutory opportunity for
hearing if for reasons of law or authorized regulation they did not
qualify for agency consideration." What was new in the decision was
this: a policy rule was issued in an authorized area of regulation, but
was subject to attack for arbitrariness because it provided an absolute
numerical proscription without hearing; however, the rule was
strengthened measurably in withstanding such attack because of the
hearing flexibility afforded by the waiver provisions contained in the
Agency's Rules of Practice and Procedure.
It would appear that in the context of the present discussion the
8' Superior Oil Co. v. FPC, 322 F.2d 601, 612 (9th Cir. 1963).
82319 U.S. 190 (1943).
83349 U.S. 358 (1955).
84351 U.S. 192, 203 (1956).
85 FCC v. WJR, 337 U.S. 265 (1949); Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Quesada, 276
F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960), 286 F.2d 319 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 962 (1961);
Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 324 F.2d 402 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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Storer case received an emphasis greater than was warranted in
Superior. The undue emphasis is caused by taking from Storer
one of its elements and virtually disregarding another interde-
pendent element. Thus in Storer, as has been observed, the Supreme
Court carefully went into the question of statutory authoriza-
tion to issue the kind of rule in issue-a legal question; then the
Supreme Court considered the question of arbitrariness of the
rule as issued-a question of the reasonableness of an agency's ap-
plication of a granted power. It was in the latter connection that
the Supreme Court gave weight to the procedural right under the
agency rules of practice to apply for a waiver of the particular rule.
According to the reasoning of the Supreme Court, such an applica-
tion for waiver, properly supported, would require approval by the
agency or an adjudicatory hearing before denial."5 Therefore, the
possibility of an arbitrary impact of a numerical ceiling rule was
diminished adequately by force of the agency's own procedures.
However, this reasoning was distinct from the statutory power to
enact a rule of this kind which the Court determined on the basis
of independent considerations.
The Ninth Circuit opinion in this connection considered solely the
general rulemaking provision of the Communications Act and dis-
regarded the more specific rulemaking provisions of the act that
were reflected in the Storer decision. The specific rulemaking pro-
visions would seem to demonstrate substantial differences in the
enabling legislation of the FCC and the FPC. Moreover, the Ninth
Circuit opinion ignored the Supreme Court decision in FCC v. ABC,
Inc., which indicated quite clearly that a commission's authority
cannot go beyond that granted by Congress.
A brief comparison of the Communications Act and the Natural
Gas Act shows that the Communications Act is a more pervasive
scheme of regulation with a much more comprehensive grant of
authority to the FPC. The Natural Gas Act is a far more narrow
grant of authority. Sections 4 and 5 permit the Commission to reject
proposed rate increases or to modify existing rates if they are not
just and reasonable or if they are unduly discriminatory or preferen-
tial. Section 7 permits the denial of a certificate if the Commission is
" Unfortunately, the language of the Supreme Court in Storer also contains reference
to the possibility of requesting an "amendment" of the rule. The Court undoubtedly had
no intention of depriving the applicant from showing special justification for obtaining
an adjudicatory hearing and subsequent judicial review upon the basis of substantial
evidence. However, the word "amendment" could imply that the applicant may be re-
stricted to submission of written views according to the established procedure for rules
amendment under § 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act. 60 Stat. 238 (1946), $
U.S.C. § 1003 (1946); see note 101 infra.
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unable to find that it is "required by the present or future public
convenience and necessity." Each section is subject to express hearing
requirements.
It is true that both section 4 (i) of the Communications Act87 and
section 16 of the Natural Gas Act" authorize the respective Com-
missions to make such rules and regulations as may be necessary in
the execution of the administrative functions concerned. It is also
true that, as the Natural Gas Act in its area of concern, the Com-
munications Act contains express provision for hearing before denial
of a broadcast license application." However, the Communications
Act-in sections 303, 307, 308, 313, 314, 315, and 317-grants the
administering agency authority to act by rule and regulation on
many substantive matters"0 including the qualification of licensees.
Thus, there is no question that the substantive rulemaking authority
of the FCC is more specific than that granted the FPC."1
"7 "The Commission may perform any and all acts, make such rules and regulations,
and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this Act, as may be necessary in the execution
of its functions." 48 Stat. 1066 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (1960).
88 52 Stat. 822 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717o (1962).
'948 Stat. 1085 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 309(b) (1960).
"Section 303(g) (48 Stat. 1082 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (1962)) provides that
the Commission, except as otherwise provided, shall from time to time as public conven-
ience, interest or necessity require: study new uses for radio and generally encourage the
larger and more effective use thereof in the public interest. Section 307(a) and (b) (48
Stat. 1083 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1962); 48 Stat. 1083 (1934), 47 U.S.C. 5
307(b) (1962)) provide for a grant of a license if the public interest will be served,
and that in the grant of application, modifications, and renewals of licenses, the Commission
shall make "such distribution of licenses, frequencies, hours of operation, and of power
among the several States and communities as to provide a fair, efficient, and equitable
distribution of radio service to each .. " Section 308(b) (76 Stat. 63 (1962), 47 U.S.C.
5 308(b) (1962)) provides that applications must set forth "such facts as the Com-
mission by regulation may prescribe as to the citizenship, character, and financial, technical
and other qualifications of the applicant to operate the station; the ownership and loca-
tion . . . the frequency and the power . . . the purpose for which the station is to be
used; and such other information as it may require. ... Section 3 (h) (48 Stat. 1065
(1934), 47 U.S.C. § 153 (h) (1956)) provides that a person engaged in radio broadcasting
shall not be deemed a common carrier. Section 313 (74 Stat. 893 (1960), 47 U.S.C. § 313a
(1960)) provides that all laws of the United States relating to unlawful restraints, com-
binations, contracts, or agreements in restraint of trade are applicable to "interstate . . .
radio communications .. ."
91 See also Dyestuffs & Chemicals, Inc. v. Flemming, 271 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1959),
wherein the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare was sustained in removing by an
order, issued after rulemaking proceedings but without adjudicatory hearing, certain food
colors for coloring such products as butter and oleomargarine. The Secretary acted under
a statute (68 Stat. 517 (1954), 21 U.S.C. 5 346(b) (1958)), providing in part: "The
Secretary shall promulgate regulations providing for the listing of coal-tar colors which
are harmless and suitable for use in food ....... .The Secretary refused the petitioner,
producer of the removed colors for some years under departmental certification, an ad-
judicatory hearing requested under a further statute providing for such hearing as to a
regulation issued upon making specific objections and stating the grounds therefor. 52
Stat. 1055 (1938). 21 U.S.C. § 371 (e) (1960). The Court held that the objections made
must be adequate to raise issues. It will be noted that the statute under which the regu-
lation was promulgated was substantive in its content. The Court cited the Storer decision.
In Denver Union Stock Yard Co. v. Producers Livestock Marketing Ass'n, 356 U.S. 282
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In evaluating Storer as authorizing the use of rules to avoid hear-
ings, the breadth of FCC authority was important. The Storer case
held no more than that, with respect to a factor which clearly had
been made an element of public interest under the Communica-
tions Act, the Commission reasonably could handle the matter by
rulemaking plus the flexibility of a waiver provision rather than the
ad hoc approach of adjudication. The Supreme Court found that
the concentration of control of communication facilities was a
legitimate factor of public interest in the context of the Communi-
cations Act which the Commission was authorized to consider either
in adjudicatory or rulemaking proceedings. Not only could the Court
point to numerous provisions of the Communications Act as the
source of substantive authority but-and this is significant-the par-
ticular element of the public interest had been judicially sustained
in a number of cases previously appealed."
In seeking to find substantive authority for the FPC, the Ninth
Circuit greatly expanded the Supreme Court decision in the Atlantic
Ref. Co. (CATCO) case." The Supreme Court in that case inter-
preted section 7 as (1) authorizing (indeed requiring) the FPC to
scrutinize initial rates in a public convenience and necessity pro-
ceeding to the extent necessary to protect the consumer against exces-
(1958), the statute made it the duty of every market agency "to furnish upon reasonable
request, without discrimination, reasonable stockyard services at such stockyard," and de-
fined the nature of the "stockyard services." 72 Star. 1750 (1958), 7 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1959). The respondent was registered as a market agency with several stock yards having
widely separated marketing areas. One such yard published a regulation prohibiting market
agencies registered with it from diverting business to other markets. The respondent com-
plained that the regulation was illegal on its face. In this case the Secretary of Agriculture,
under the Packers and Stockyards Act (42 Stat. 159 (1921), 7 U.S.C. § 181 (1921)),
had taken the contrary position that the respondent must come forward with evidence.
The Supreme Court held for the respondent. The Storer decision was cited, in view of the
provision for "hearing" in the statute (42 Star. 165 (1921), 7 U.S.C. S 210 (1959)),
the court observing that a hearing would be futile when the statute obviously required the
market agency to furnish its services without discrimination to the various stockyards of
which respondent was a member.
92 As early as 1937 the FCC found that the multiple ownership of radio facilities had
adverse implications to the public convenience and necessity. In re Community Broadcasting
Co., 4 F.C.C. 422 (1937); In re Martinsburg Broadcasters Co., 11 F.C.C. 419 (1946);
In re Finger Lakes Broadcasting Co., 11 F.C.C. 528 (1946); In re Orolhlich Bros., 11
F.C.C. 700 (1946); In re Bamberger Broadcasting Co., 11 F.C.C. 211 (1946). The pro-
priety of this articulation of the meaning of the statutory standard of public convenience
and necessity was judicially approved by numerous court decisions prior to Storer. Clarks-
burg Pub. Co. v. FCC, 225 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC,
189 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Plains Radio Broadcasting v. FCC, 175 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir.
1949). Indeed, the Storer case itself recognizes that the Supreme Court had in FCC v.
Allentown Broadcasting Co., 349 U.S. 358 (1955), agreed that improper concentration of
control was an element of public interest. 351 U.S. 192, 203 n.12 (1956).
"a But see, for an apparent extension of this reasoning, United Gas Improvement Co. v.
FPC, 283 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied sub nom., Superior Oil Co. v. United
Gas Improvement Co., 365 U.S. 879 (1961). United Gas, however, does not extend
CATCO in such a manner as to form a substantive basis for the price-changing rules in
question here.
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sive costs which might otherwise ensue during the period between
first deliveries under initial rates and a final order in a section 5 pro-
ceeding and (2) authorizing the FPC to condition the grant of a
certificate under section 7 upon acceptance of specific lowered initial
rates." The court found that the basic congressional intent was to
protect the consumer against unjust and unreasonable prices and
that the lack of this implied power would defeat the clear intent of
Congress. No such reasoning supports the assumption by the Ninth
Circuit that section 7 likewise implies power to proscribe price-
changing clauses; these clauses merely permit the producers to file
for increased prices which can only be charged if the FPC finds them
just and reasonable under section 4." Thus, the Ninth Circuit de-
cision seems to extend congressional intent and, at least inferentially,
give some weight to administrative convenience as a factor supporting
the avoidance of the hearing requirements."
In addition, it is questionable whether the Ninth Circuit opinion
is correct in its conclusion that Storer implicitly disposed of the
constitutional question of due process under the fifth amendment. It
is clear that in Storer no property right was involved; the only
matter involved was the license privilege to use the radio spectrum
under certain circumstances."7 There the Supreme Court could well
"Wisconsin v. FPC, 373 U.S. 294, 304 (1963).
95 See note 9 supra.
" Superior Oil Co. v. FPC, 322 F.2d 601, 620. However, difficulties of administration
do not justify administrative extension of statutory meaning. Addison v. Holly Hill
Fruit Prod., Inc., 322 U.S. 607 (1944); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177
(1941); Kessler v. FCC, 326 F.2d 673, 687 (D.C. Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Transcoa Chem.
Corp., 303 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. FPC, 202 F.2d 899,
902-03 (3d Cir. 1953).
The court early in its discussion appears to have accepted the FPC rationale in Pure
Oil Co. v. FPC, 299 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1962), as though the court in that case sustained
the FPC's conclusions as to the undesirability of certain price-changing clauses. In fact
the Seventh Circuit in that case merely sustained the Commission's ultimate finding that
on the facts of record the price-changing clause had not been triggered within the triggering
standards provided by the terms of the contract and therefore did not permit the filing
of a new rate.
97 See, e.g., § 304 of the Communications Act (48 Stat. 1083 (1934), 47 U.S.C.
304 (1934)) which provides:
No station license shall be granted by the Commission until the applicant
therefor shall have signed a waiver of any claim to the use of any particular
frequency or of the ether as against the regulatory power of the United States
because of the previous use of the same, whether by license or otherwise. See
also Section 307(d) of the Act (47 USC 307(d) limiting broadcast license
terms to three years; Section 301 (47 USC 301) providing that no license
shall be construed to create any right beyond its terms, conditions and periods;
and Section 309(h) (47 USC 309(h) further providing that a station license
"shall not vest in the licensee any right to operate the station nor any right
in the use of the frequencies designated in the license beyond the term there-
of. ...
See also Transcontinent Television Corp. v. FCC, 308 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
This is not to deprecate the right to a fair and adequate administrative procedure that
should be recognized in persons who, due to our much-regulated economy, must be
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conclude that if Congress had authorized and granted the right to
a hearing in certain circumstances it could also, by an adequately
directionalized grant of authority to the Commission to issue rules,
permit handling of those questions in instances falling within the
specific grant by rulemaking rather than adjudication. In the natural
gas field, however, as was pointed out by the Tenth Circuit in Texaco,
the Supreme Court has stated that the Natural Gas Act did not
"abrogate private rate contracts as such."" A constitutional question
clearly would be presented had Congress granted the FPC authority
to regulate initial contracts without the due process of an adjudica-
tory hearing.9 The grant of authority to modify producer's initial
contracts after hearing on the normal standards of rate making, i.e.,
"just and reasonable," would comply with the due process require-
ment. However, the elimination of the adjudicatory hearing either
by Congress or, as here, by the legislative rulemaking of the FPC
could well run afoul of the constitutional proscription. In the Superior
Oil decision the court said:
If the explicit amendment and repeal provisions and the implicit waiver
provision of the agency's rules are sufficient to meet the requirements
of the express statutory provisions pertaining to hearings (and we have
held that they are), it would seem that they are also sufficient to meet
the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment."'
If Congress specifically has set forth both provisions for adjudica-
tory proceedings and rulemaking authority, it can well be held that
with respect to specific areas of congressional grant of authority the
agency may handle certain matters as it administratively determines
certificated or licensed by the Government before they may pursue an occupation or venture
into a business. Their procedural rights are, generally, lesser in degree because in mostinstances they have difficulty in establishing a property right or an enforceable personal
freedom unless the legislature has acted in their behalf. Professor Jaffe makes the case well
for such persons:
It is true, of course that the Government because of its guarantee of air
carrier deficits is making an investment. But the certification process excludes
any private investment whether or not the applicant seeks a subsidy. The
actions of the CAB are much more-and much less-than a private decision
to invest. They involve a determination whether A or B or neither shall
invest, on pain of use of force if the losing party persists in flying airplanes
for profit despite the Government veto. It is this total exclusion from the
field on pain of penalty which distinguishes 'regulation' from a grant or loan
which may, of course, be denied without formal procedure. It may well be
that formal procedure impedes the best exercise of judgment in these areas
of licensed activity. But the citizen will find it difficult to tolerate a power to
exclude him and admit his neighbor if the power is exercised in camera....
Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: A Reevaluation, 67
Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1130 (1954).
"'United Gas Co. v. Mobile Gas Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 338 (1956).
"Cooper, Administrative Agencies and the Courts 72-74 (1951).
"'0Superior Oil Co. v. FPC, 322 F.2d 601, 614 (9th Cir. 1963).
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is desirable, either by rulemaking under the procedures prescribed
in section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act'" or by the ad hoc
approach."" However, this is not a complete answer to a question of
due process involving the taking of a property right.' Furthermore,
104the attempt of the Ninth Circuit to distinguish the Morgan case,
as a rate-fixing case, is not entirely convincing because the price
changing clauses of the contracts are the only means whereby the
producer may request any changes in the rates at which the gas
is sold.
The Ninth Circuit opinion, then, appears to be open to the serious
questions (1) that it is founded largely upon a Supreme Court decision
resting upon independent sources of rulemaking power possessed by
the FCC, a basis not discernibly present in the case of the FPC and
(2) that a constitutional question of due process was met by the
reasoning of the same Supreme Court decision in which no constitu-
tional issue was present.
105
" Section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act (60 Stat. 238 (1946), ; U.S.C. 5
1003(a) (1958)) provides in pertinent part:
[With exceptions not pertinent] (a) Notice.-General notice of proposed
rule making shall be published in the Federal Register . . . and shall include
(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rulemaking pro-
ceedings; (2) reference to the authority under which the rule is proposed;
and (3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description
of the subjects and issues involved ...
(b) Procedures.-After notice by this section, the agency shall afford inter-
ested persons an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking through sub-
mission of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity to
present the same orally, in any manner; and after consideration of all relevant
matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in any rules adopted a concise
general statement of their basis and purpose. Where rules are required by
statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing,
the requirements of sections 7 and 8 shall apply in place of the provisions of
this subsection.
1' Logansport Broadcasting Corp. v. United States, 210 F.2d 24, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1954);
see also Baker, Policy by Rule or Ad Hoc Approach-Which Should It Be?, 22 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 658 (1957).50 3FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 606-07 (1944). The solutions in
this event should not necessarily be sought in such polarized procedures as (1) a full-scale
evidentiary hearing for each company or (2) a S 4 (Administrative Procedure Act)
"written views" proceeding for all companies. Hearings may take other forms consistent
with the subject matter and the substance of the right asserted. For a discussion of the
problems involved, see Fuchs, Constitutional Implications of the Opp Cotton Mills Case
With Respect To Procedure and judicial Review in Administrative Rule-Making, 27 Wash.
U.L.Q. 1 (1941).
'"Morgin v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1937). This case involved the fixing by the
Secretary of Agriculture of maximum rates to be charged by market agencies at the
Kansas City Stock Yards. The controlling statute provided for a hearing. A hearing was
held. This decision reversed the government decision for failure to accord due process of
law because its order was based on grounds of which the respondents were given inadequate
notice prior to or during the hearing.
... United Gas Pipeline Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 358 U.S. 103, 113-14
(1958); Willmut Gas & Oil Co. v. FPC, 294 F.2d 245, 250 (D.C. Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 975 (1962). Moreover, it may be noted that in the Storer de-
cision the Court was meticulous in its regard for the appropriate protection of statutory
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The Commission's contention in both proceedings was that it
possessed general regulatory power under section 16 and that this
power read in the context of the act as a whole extended to the
matters covered in other sections of the act, in this case sections 4, 5,
and 7."°' In the orders that underlie the litigation, its position was
expressed in terms of necessity and appropriateness in the public
interest and in the proper administration of the Natural Gas Act."'
Furthermore, the Commission concluded:
[S]ections 4, 5 and 7 of the Natural Gas Act contemplate that the
Commission will refuse to approve contractual provisions found adverse
to the public interest. Section 16 of the Act, of course, authorizes the
Commission to issue rules and regulations of general applicability found
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of the Act."8
As the opinion of the Tenth Circuit points out, however, sections
4, 5, and 7 set forth hearing procedures for their implementation;
they bestow substantive powers and duties upon the Commission
dependent for their effectuation upon the expressed statutory mode
of exercise of these powers and duties."' To depart from the statutory
hearing rights, as witnessed by the reservation in the opinion that one who failed to
meet the requirements of the rule in issue could seek a waiver and consequent adjudicatory
hearing upon special justification shown (a condition fully recognized and preserved by
the Ninth Circuit opinion). Thus, notwithstanding the strength of the delegated rulemaking
authority, the Supreme Court, in avoidance of the arbitrary effect of a numerical ceiling rule
in special circumstances, did not go the full distance in upholding a pervasive regulation.
Inherent in the escalator rule litigation, however, as we have seen, are difficult problems:
rulemaking control asserted from a general rule making delegation and from the very
sections that provide for ad hoc hearings and on the very subjects of concern therein;
and invocable property rights recognized by past decisions-to make gas supply contracts
and to operate under such contracts subject to the statutory standards.
o6 Pertinent provisions of these sections are set out in notes 7-9 supra.
107 Order 232, 25 F.P.C. 379 (1961); Order 232A, 25 F.P.C. 609 (1961).
'
0
eOrder 242, 27 F.P.C. 339 (1962).
50 The Tenth Circuit based its holding in this regard upon FCC v. American Broadcast-
ing Co., Inc., 347 U.S. 284, 290 (1954); FPC v. Panhandle E. Pipeline Co., 337 U.S.
498 (1949); Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prod., Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 617-18 (1944);
Willmut Gas & Oil Co. v. FPC, 294 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
975 (1962). In the Willmut case as stated in the Ninth Circuit opinion that distinguished
the case, adjudication rather than a rulemaking was involved. The court in Willmut, in
meeting a contention of one of the parties, however, said:
Section 16 of the Act speaks in broad and general terms. . . . But the broad
power granted by this statutory language does not authorize an order, rule
or regulation which would nullify or restrict the right of a natural gas
company to change the rate under which it offers to furnish service, subject
only to the requirement of section 4(d) of the Act that it notify the Com-
mission of the changes, so that it may proceed under Section 4(e) ....
294 F.2d at 250.
In the Panhandle case the Supreme Court affirmed the refusal of an injunction sought
by the FPC to prevent assignment of leaseholds by Panhandle as endangering its ability
to serve its customers under its certificate from the FPC. The holding was that jurisdiction
over gas reserves, in the framework of the statute, remained with the states. The Court
spoke to FPC's argument for its regulatory authority under § 16 as follows: "The power
to do the things appropriate to carry out the provisions of the Act can hardly be taken
to rescind a prohibition against certain actions." 337 U.S. at 508. The American Broad-
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course of procedure "precludes the possibility of any effective judicial
review.' '. Moreover, the court said sections 4 and 5 permit modifica-
tion of contracts by the Commission, but this does not include Com-
mission power to make contracts."' The Commission's orders speak
in ultimate terms with respect to these substantive problems found
by the Tenth Circuit as conclusive of the absence of administrative au-
thority for the rulemaking action taken."' It is open to serious
question, therefore, whether the orders constitute a rational basis
supporting the rules adopted."'
Another basic point of departure between the two courts of appeals
decisions appears in their difference in approach to the method of
judicial review of the rules. The Ninth Circuit stated that only a legal
question was presented."4 The rules would be considered on the
basis of the factual premise presented by the Commission. This
factual premise did not include the rulemaking transcripts, which
were not filed with either court. In the Tenth Circuit proceeding
one petitioner stated that the FPC had refused to file the rulemaking
records."' The appeal in the Ninth Circuit was decided upon a stipu-
lated record.
The Court in the Tenth Circuit proceeding observed:
Summary rejection of the Texaco and Pan American contracts without
a hearing deprives the court of any record upon which the rejection
may be sustained, other than the general orders which are attacked ...
the Commission has successfully maintained that these general orders
are not subject to direct court review. This bootstrap operation of the
Commission, in practical effect, circumvents court review of the basic
question-the propriety of indefinite price-changing clauses."'
The Tenth Circuit thus said clearly that rejection (adjudicatory
action), or the rules on which the rejection was based (rulemaking),
did not present purely a legal question but a question of substance
casting case is referred to in note 70 supra. The Addison case reversed the Administrator
of the Wage and Hour Division who construed the words "area of production" in the
act that he administered as empowering him not only to designate territorial boundaries
but also the number of employees working in a particular establishment.
10 317 F.2d 796, 807 (10th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 32 U.S.L. Week 4370 (U.S. 1964).
"' id. at 805. The distinction traces to the point made in Mobile wherein the more
specific regulatory authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission was compared. See
note 5 supra.
12See notes 107-08 supra.
"'See Logansport Broadcasting Corp. v. United States, 210 F.2d 24, 27 (D.C. Cir.
1954).
114 322 F.2d at 619.
"' Brief for Pan American Petroleum Corp. on Answer to Revised Motion to Dismiss
Reply of Petitioner, p. 11, Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 317 F.2d 796 (10th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 32
U.S.L. Week 4370 (U.S. 1964).
'"1Texaco v. FPC, supra note 115, at 804-05.
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to be reviewed upon evidence in a record before the court.11 Equally
clearly, the Tenth Circuit's statement is influenced by its judgment
that the rulemaking subject matter is governed by provisions re-
quiring an evidentiary hearing. It follows that an administrative rule-
making record consisting only of briefs and written views and state-
ments which constituted the unfiled administrative transcripts in
these proceedings would not meet the objection raised by the Tenth
Circuit."'
The Ninth Circuit's restricted review of the rules, pursuant to a
question of law designation, may be compared with the broader
review accorded in Storer by the Supreme Court. In the latter case
the entire rulemaking record was filed both in the court of appeals
and in the Supreme Court."' The Supreme Court, at one point,
117 63 Star. 107 (1949), 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (1958) provides:
Any party to a proceeding . . . aggrieved by an order issued by the Com-
mission . . . may obtain a review of such order in the court of appeals of
the United States . . . by filing in such court . . . a written petition ...
the Commission shall file with the court the record upon which the order
complained of was entered, as provided in section 2112 of Title 28 . . . such
court shall have jurisdiction . . . to affirm, modify, or set aside such order in
whole or in part . . . The finding of the Commission as to the facts, if sup-
ported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. If any party shall apply to
the court for leave to adduce additional evidence, and shall show to the
satisfaction of the court that such additional evidence is material and that
there were reasonable grounds for failure to adduce such evidence in the
proceedings before the Commission, the court may order such additional
evidence to be taken before the Commission and to be adduced upon the
hearing in such manner and upon such terms and conditions as to the court
may seem proper ...
28 U.S.C. § 2112(a) (1958) provides: "[T]he several courts of appeals shall have power
to adopt . . . rules . . . prescribing the time and manner of filing and the contents of the
record .. " 28 U.S.C. § 2112(b) (1958) specifies: "[T]he record to be filed in the court
of appeals in such a proceeding shall consist of the order sought to be reviewed or enforced,
the findings or report upon which is based, and the pleadings, evidence, and proceeedings
before the agency, board, commission, or offices concerned . . . or such portions thereof as
the rules of the court of appeals might require."
See also 73 Stat. 9 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 501 (1959); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72-76 (especially
R. 75(o)); 9th Cir. R. 34; 10th Cir. R. 34(7). 9th Cir. R. 34 pertains to the "Review
or Enforcement of Orders of Administrative Agencies, Boards, Commissions and Officers."
9th Cir. R. 10 "Appeals, Return and Record" specifies that "the clerk of the . . . Com-
mission shall transmit to the clerk of this Court the original files designated by the respec-
tive parties as the record on appeal or review."
10th Cir. R. 34(7) pertains to the "Transcript in Review and Enforcement Proceedings
-Time for Filing-contents-Abbreviation by Stipulation or Order." It provides: "[T]he
transcript of the record on review shall include the entire record in the proceeding
before the agency, board, commission or officer when so required by the applicable statute."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72-76 apply to Appeals. Rule 75(o) requires the appellant to serve a
"designation of the portions of the record, proceedings, and evidence to be contained in
the record on application . . ."
"' The orders and regulations of the FPC, unless determinative of a petitioner's status,
are not subject to review under § 19(b). Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 236 F.2d 785
(5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 968 (1957). When they are given definitive
impact against the petitioner by an order assertedly based upon them, a petition for review
lies. Sun Oil Co. v. FPC, 304 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1962); see also United Gas Pipeline Co.
v. FPC, 181 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 827 (1950).
'19351 U.S. 192 (1956), Joint Appendix.
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18
referred to the extensive administrative hearings held120 and, at
another point, to matters presented by the respondent during the
administrative proceeding.12' Moreover, in Storer the Court cited
repeatedly the case of FCC v. NBC,'22 a rulemaking case in which
this statement was made by the Court: "Our duty is at an end when
we find that the action of the Commission was based upon findings
supported by evidence, and was made pursuant to authority con-
)3123ferred by Congress....
As stated by Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, there are three ele-
ments for consideration by a court in reviewing a rule.124 The first,
the question of legal power to make the rule under the statute itself,
was raised in the present proceedings. The second, more frequently
an issue and in issue in the present proceedings, is the validity of the
rule as a rational exercise of agency discretion. The third is whether
the rule was issued pursuant to proper procedure.
As to the second element, the scope of judicial review should be
broader than the opinion of the Ninth Circuit would seem to indicate.
The court's consideration should not be narrowed to the rationality of
the agency's ultimate conclusions or a statement-however limited-
designated by the agency as its "factual premise" for the rule. When
factual considerations are at issue, agency conclusions are slim ma-
2 
1 Id. at 205.
155 Id. at 193-94. In Storer, as emphasized by this footnote and footnote 92, the Court
gave consideration to the reasonableness of the FCC rules on the basis of a rulemaking
record. This is evident from its attention to a position of Storer expressed in that record
as filed with the Court. The scrutiny of the Court then was not limited to an ultimate
conclusion of the FCC (compare earlier portions of this Article for a description of
the ultimate character of the FPC findings) or a "factual premise" of that agency untested
by context or adverse contention. Insofar as the administrative procedure is concerned,
neither the FCC nor the FPC held an adjudicatory hearing as a part of the rulemakings.
122 319 U.S. 190 (1943). This case was decided before enactment of the Administrative
Procedure Act in 1946.
The exhaustive preliminary investigations and procedural care undertaken prior to the
promulgation of an agency rule have been weighed by the courts. In Atlas Powder Co. v,
Ewing, 201 F.2d 347 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 923 (1953), the Federal Se-
curity Administrator issued an order establishing a standard of identity for bread under
the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 52 Stat. 1046 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 341 (1958).
The statute required such regulations, as in his judgment would promote honesty and fair
dealing in the interest of consumers, establishing for any food a reasonable standard of
identity, quality, and fill of containers. Further, it provided that if optional ingredients
were permitted by the Secretary he should designate them, and they should be named on
the label. After an extensive investigatory hearing, during which the petitioners attempted
to prove that the standard of identity for bread should include their bread softeners as
optional ingredients, the Secretary refused to change the standard for this purpose. On
appeal the court held that substantial evidence in the record of the proceeding sustained
the findings of the Secretary that the option sought would tend to deceive consumers of
the bread that it was fresher than it was. The court said further: -[T]he fact that
administrative action has been dominated by great caution but serves to emphasize the
reasonableness of the Administrator's conduct. ... 201 F.2d at 355.
'2 FCC v. NBC, 319 U.S. 190, 224 (1943).
'41 Davis, Administrative Law, § 5.05, at 314-15 (1958).
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terials upon which to test whether agency action is unreasonable,
arbitrary, or capricious. An agency's "factual premise" may be quite
unresponsive to the data, views, and evidence brought together in
a proceeding designed for the twin purpose of assisting the agency
and according the participants a fair opportunity to be heard.
This is not intended to imply, of course, that the aggrieved person
contesting the rule may not face presumptions of regularity or
reasonableness as to which he needs to raise a substantial question.
It is to say that the court should not limit its own review to such
confines as deprive it of the materials that may be required to
make a judgment respecting rationality of the rule.
This should hold especially true when the rules, though broad in
nature and founded in policy, have immediate, direct, and permanent
effect upon the rate provisions of gas sales contracts. Past decisions
of the Supreme Court prevent the producer from filing for a rate
higher than is provided in his contract. By submitting to the stipu-
lated "price-changing" provisions, as Order 242 designates them,1"
the producer irrevocably commits himself to the contractual ceilings
determined under these changed price rules.
As stated by Judge Fahy in Capital Transit Co. v. Public Utilities
Comm'n :..
But the evidence and findings must bring the situation within these
tests if they are to apply. Even were we to assume the evidence should
support such findings as to the entire urban zone the Commission itself
should first make them on the basis of its own consideration of the
evidence. . . . The Commission does refer in its opinion to the fact
that the urban zone has been extended from time to time. . . . The
Commission also states the record indicates that it is desirable and
equitable. . . . But we are not justified in translating these general
statements either into findings of similarity of costs and revenues . . .
or into other terms which support the reasonableness of rates in that part
of the urban zone. . . . The importance and character of the subject
call for findings which reflect the subsidiary and ultimate bases for the
action taken . . . or . . . other factors by which the reasonableness of
the District rates can be judged....
The basic problem is whether rates fixed by the Commission for the
District are on a higher level than they reasonably and justly should
be due to other sources not bearing their fair share of revenues. We
do not now decide whether this is the fact or not. But when the
problem lies across jurisdictional lines and is not solved by the permis-
sible formulae of allocating as between jurisdictions . . . the method
12527 F.P.C. 339, 340 (1962).
'26 213 F.2d 176, 183-84 (D.C. Cir. 1954). The case involved review of a rate proceed-
ing in which a power company, by virtue of serving customers in the District of Columbia,
Virginia, and other interstate consumers, was subject to regulation by the FPC and the
Public Utilities Commissions of the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia.
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which is adopted must be rationally manifested in findings and con-
clusions, the former grounded in evidence and the latter in evidence
and reasoning, which enable the court to support the District rates
alone. The burden upon Transit to sustain its attack upon the orders,
see King v. United States [344 U.S. 254] is carried when such findings,
essential to adequate review, are lacking .... The statutory duty of this
court to review questions of law implies the necessity for such find-
ings. 1 (Emphasis added.)
V. CONCLUSIONS
In leading decisions dealing with the review of administrative rules
of similar import, there is precedent for judicial cognizance of the
procedural fairness that has attended the promulgation of the rules.
Thus in a rulemaking of the seriousness discussed in this Article,
judicial affirmance of the rules as possessing a rational basis might
well take into consideration whether the regulations are the product
of a careful weighing of all pertinent factors involved from the
standpoint of the public and of the persons regulated.' The rules
are broad and of a policy character, and therefore the Commission
should not be limited to action of a purely ad hoc nature. However,
the statutory policy providing for evidentiary hearings should be
observed. In such a situation of apparent need for accommodation of
statutory provisions for rulemaking and for adjudication, it is sug-
gested that one of two administrative courses of action should be
required. The first-as instanced by such rule review decisions as the
Assigned Car Cases,"' SEC v. Chenery Corp.,"' Illinois Commerce
Comm'n v. United States,'' NBC v. United States,aa and United
"'The Texaco decision, 317 F.2d 796, 805-06 (10th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 32 U.S.L.
Week 4370 (U.S. 1964), stated that such findings as the FPC made in Orders 232, 232A,
and 242 were "not made in the language of the statutory standards of 'just and reasonable'
and 'public convenience and necessity'." In the absence of an evidentiary hearing, such find-
ings would present greater difficulty as applicable to fair and reasonable pricing terms of
these long-term contractual relationships.
12 The Supreme Court has expressed the general congressional intent in drafting the
Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 833 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717(a)-(w) (1938):
It seems plain that Congress, in so drafting the statute was not only expressing
its conviction that the public interest requires the protection of consumers
from excessive prices for natural gas, but was also manifesting its concern for
the legitimate interests of natural gas companies in whose financial stability
the gas-consuming public has a vital stake .... United Gas Pipe Line Co. v.
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 358 U.S. 103, 113 (1958).
The provision for "hearing" in the sections of the Natural Gas Act cited in this Article
means a full hearing, e.g., an adjudicatory or evidentiary hearing. Willmut Gas & Oil
Co. v. FPC, 294 F.2d 245, 250-51 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 975 (1962).
Though the rulemaking power of the Commission under § 16 of the act is broad, the
power must be exercised in light of the initial rate-making and rate-changing powers of
the natural gas companies which are undefined and unaffected by the act. Id. at 250.
"9274 U.S. 564 (1926).
'3O332 U.S. 194 (1947).
'292 U.S. 474 (1934).
18231 9 U.S. 190 (1943).
1964] RULES WITHOUT EVIDENTIARY HEARING 269
States v. Storer Broadcasting Co."3'-is the establishment of the bases
for the rule by a series of adjudicatory hearings that developed the
full outlines of the problem and foundation facts for its solution by
the exercise of expert administrative discretion. The second is the
initiation by the agency of a broad investigatory hearing at which
representative evidence is taken, though not necessarily as a matter
of individual adjudication. The latter procedure is illustrated by
such cases of rulemaking litigation as American Trucking Ass'ns,
Inc. v. United States; NBC v. United States;... New York v.
United States;13 6 Pacific States Box &4 Basket Co. v. White;"7 Willa-
point Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing;." and Logansport Broadcasting Corp. v.
United States."'
On an issue of such grave economic significance the regulation
of the agency should rest upon an adequate rationale. That rationale,
because it is determinative of economic facts and projections both
broad and individual in their characteristics and impact, should be
based in turn upon competent, relevant, and material factual premises.
Under either of the two suggested procedures, these should be obtain-
able with adequacy. In all likelihood they would not be under the
procedure followed by the FPC, which neither took the form of an
investigatory type rulemaking nor was preceded by judicially affirmed
policy based on a number of adjudicatory proceedings. In fact its
reliance upon what amounts to its own dicta in the Pure Oil case and
its failure to cite other cases are indicative of this basic weakness.
It is not suggested that in each of the cases mentioned the procedure
was the sine qua non for a judicial decision upholding the agency
rulemaking. It is suggested that in each case the court gave con-
sideration to the evidence developed in the course of determining
the agency regulation to be a rational exercise of its authority. It is
further suggested that effective judicial review makes desirable either
of these forms of procedure in circumstances involving the immedi-
ate, serious, and major economic effects found in these rules.
It is believed that the desirable becomes the essential when a
reconciliation of the grant of authority to make regulations and a
grant of authority to review rates and contracts is required by
express and pertinent differences in statutory procedure as dis-
cussed in the course of this Article. The Court of Appeals for the
13351 U.S. 192 (1956).
'34 344 U.S. 298 (1953).
'35319 U.S. 190 (1943).
'3331 U.S. 284 (1947).
"37296 U.S. 176 (1935).
'38 174 F.2d 676 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949).
' 210 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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District of Columbia recently indicated the strength of the rule-
making section of the Natural Gas Act in an appeal involving statu-
tory reconciliation, unattended, however, by the issue of statutory
right to hearing.140 The same court, also recently, effected a reconcilia-
tion with respect to an FCC rule. The Court upheld an FCC rule
that eliminated a television frequency that had been licensed to a
private corporation, because the license term extended only for three
years and the Commission postponed the effect of the rule upon the
existing licensee to the end of his license term."'
A similar reconciliation would appear to be available in the present
problem area. 42 The Commission has both rulemaking and investiga-
tory power. Its rules under consideration are of a broad policy char-
acter, an inherent element of a regulatory rule. They cover the sub-
ject of future price increases by contract, the regulation of which
Congress confided to the Commission subject to express standards
and procedures. The procedural requirements stipulate the holding
of hearings as the method of this exercise of regulation.
As has been seen, no hearing preceded the issuance of the rules
being considered. An appropriate form of hearing consonant with
the policy considerations involved and the substantive impact of the
policy determined would seem an antecedent condition to the issuance
of rules if reconciliation of the statutory provisions is to be effected.4
That result could be attained, as earlier indicated, by a representa-
tive sampling of ad hoc adjudicatory hearings or by an investigatory
14 Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 327 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
... Transcontinental Television Corp. v. FCC, 308 F.2d 339, 344 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
142 Dean Newman has recently said:
Most important of all, we need further analyses where Professor Davis has
shown us that our work to date is mostly exploratory. To illustrate: Has he
not proved that 'More harmful than helpful is the proposition . . . that
hearings are required for judicial functions but not for legislative func-
tions . . .' If that be true, do we not desperately need some learned scrutiny
of our mystique regarding 'hearing on the record'?
Newman, The Literature of Administrative law and the New Davis Treatise, 43 Minn. L.
Rev. 637, 650 (1959). (Footnote omitted.)
14 This need was recognized by the Report of the Committee on Rulemaking to the
Administrative Conference of the United States, September 18, 1962, when it said: "Indi-
vidualized determinations on the basis of a record after a hearing having many adjudicatory
characteristics have in the past been thought to be required when an agency was fixing
maximum rates, since a rate set at too low a level would result in confiscation of private
property .. " Id. at 6.
The Committee made certain recommendations to the Conference, which were adopted
(Final Report of the Administrative Conference of the United States to the President,
December 15, 1962, Recommendation No. 19), one of which pertained to "Reducing the
Number or Scope of Rate Proceedings Prior to Hearing" and involved such considerations
as requiring rate applicants to submit detailed data justifying rate filings of general im-
portance; developing standardized data relating to such matter as costs admissible as
prima facie proof in rate cases; encouraging negotiated settlement of rate cases; and
"attempting by rulemaking, general policy statements, or the reasoning in opinions to
formulate reasonably specific standards or principles to be applied in rate cases." Id. at 19.
[Vol. 18
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hearing, each or both laying the foundation for rules responsive to
facts, economic data, and reasoned expert judgment. Without this
foundation a power that has been bestowed by the Congress subject
to extending the right of full and fair hearing will have been exer-
cised informally under lesser safeguards and less reliable information
for administrative decision, and it may be added, upon analysis of
the rulemaking procedure followed, with undue restriction of the
scope of judicial review.1"
Regardless of (1) the Commission's judgment that the public
interest per se requires adoption of the rules in question or (2) the
administrative burdens that the Commission has sought to eliminate
or minimize by these rules, the procedure followed by the Commis-
sion in reaching this result raises questions of grave concern relative
to government by edict in lieu of government through regulation
pursuant to authorized statutory process.
t [Editor's Note: The Supreme Court, on April 20, 1964, 32 U.S.L. Week 4370 (U.S.
1964), decided the Texaco case, reversing the Tenth Circuit. This Article, prepared before
the Supreme Court rendered its opinion, is published without change. The Court virtually
adopted the theory of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Superior Oil v. FPC. This latter de-
cision has been analyzed at length in this Article. Much of that which is said regarding
Superior Oil is applicable to the Texaco decision by the United States Supreme Court.]
'4 In the words of Professor Jaffe, judicial review thereby does no more than assert
itself primarily to protect "the clear statutory purpose." Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question
of Law, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 239, 261 (1955). See also Cooper, Administrative Agencies and
the Courts, 342-44 (1951).
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